Impacting various aircraft system, GNSS interference remains a focus area for the airlines, the wider industry and IATA. The threat of interference, either in the form of jamming or spoofing, predominantly originates from military activity or other malicious state actors.
The SIRM discussed that GNSS interference is unlikely to reduce in the short term, with it remaining an issue operator are exposed to an ongoing basis in various regionals of the world. It was recognised that hot spots are found in the vicinity of conflict areas.
The primary impact on aircraft systems includes:
As well as safety implications, the loss of navigation or surveillance capability can impact flight planning. Aircraft may not be able to route transatlantic using the North Atlantic Tracks or operate in Reduced Vertical Separation Minima (RVSM) airspace having lost GNSS signal. Consequently, the aircraft may need to divert or take a different routing that incurs a significant fuel and/or time penalty.
The dependency on satellite-based navigation systems was discussed with the potential removal of ground-based navigation aids, such as VOR/DME, that had been proposed in European airspace for example. The SIRM highlighted the importance of retaining ground-based infrastructure, which isn’t typically impacted by interference, to provide redundancy.
SIRM members recognised that in in addition to its impact on aircraft systems, GNSS interference impacts flight crew stress levels and may contribute to fatigue, particularly for crews operating in the vicinity to conflict zones where GNSS jamming or spoofing is impacting a large proportion of flights.
IATA has developed a comprehensive risk assessment – operators are encouraged to review this document in developing their own risk assessment. High level recommendations from the SRA are found below:
